This study uses the performance of the discretionary estimation models by using a sample of listed companies in the Netherlands and Germany. The actual accounting framework provides a wide opportunity for managers to influence data in financial reporting. The corporate reporting strategy, the way managers use their discretionary accounting, has a significant effect on the company's financial reporting. The authors contribute to the literature through enhancement to these models to accomplish better effects of identifying earnings management as well as to present evidence that is particular to the Dutch and German setting.
value of earnings, reduces the estimation of risk and also have a positive impact on stock prices.
Finally, by fixing specially on the effect of governance appearances on earnings management inducements, corporate governance codes around the world emphasize the role of governance in reducing opportunistic manipulation of earnings and ensuring that profit figures are real information about the company's operations (Lei and Liu 2007) . To understand the causes and effects of earnings management on stock prices, we study the relationship among earnings management as dependent variable, expected stock returns, and corporate governance as independent variables. We find that the relationship exists between the level of earnings management and expected stock returns, and the discretionary accruals-relation depends on reported earnings and corporate governance.
This paper intends to determine the causes and effects of earnings management on stock prices through stock returns. Moreover, we investigate the effect of corporate governance as an independent variable in reducing opportunistic manipulation of earnings.
In the determining of corporate governance with regard to earnings management and stock returns, this study find that the relationship is somewhat different in these two countries. It lies primarily in the strength of corporate governance. Along this line, corporate authority and bookkeeping systems appear to have a considerable impact on earnings management as indicated by observational writings. Different factors likewise assume also have influence for example, size of firms and institutional advantage (Wali, 2017).
The central point is the use of accruals measures. For the reporting period, net profit is a key index of the overall capacity of the company. In addition, to identify the most important indicators of the causes and effects on the practice of earnings management using a sample of 777 and 1477 company-years for Dutch and German listed companies respectively during the year 2004-2014, including variables which are value relevant based on previous studies. This study takes part to current research in a number of ways: it improves a model for estimated accruals, which takes the relationship between several variables more desirable than previous models. It suggests that the modified Jones model has moderate explanatory power. Moreover, the paper extends the literature on earnings management to a European setting, includes the examinations whether earnings management through accruals accounting effects the stock returns, and the influence of corporate governance in determining opportunistic earnings manipulation.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows9 Section 2 presents the literature review on the two arguable perceptions about earnings management with a summary overview on the evidence and test hypotheses related to relationships between earnings management, stock return, and corporate governance. Section 3 Sets up and describes the models of discretionary accruals

Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences
85
The Causes and Effects of Earnings Management on Stock Prices
Vol.25 No.116 2019 and methodology used in the study, further this section formulated the hypotheses. Section 4 demonstrates and analyzes the result that obtained from the models empirically. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development:
2.1 Causes of earnings management 2.1.1 Earnings management is efficient to value relevant information. Prior studies classify earnings management into two parts: actual profit management and accruals management. It suggests that management is extra willing to participate in managing actual earnings, for example by influencing operational cash flows than to manage benefits during management adjustments to classifications and accounting plans. Accordingly, it seems to contradict the high costs of managing the actual profit. Other study finds that strength of governance decreases the certain correlation between discretionary accruals and audit fees, therefore, suggesting that earnings exercised to convey incremental information content. (Dichev et al. 2012) .
Another example of the study examines the appropriateness of earnings value based on generally accepted accounting principle, international accounting standard in the United States, and German accounting. The study found that international accounting standard earnings are progressively significant than those based on German generally accepted accounting. The disparity in the aftereffects of these two investigations can be discovered it in that Bartov 
Earnings management is opportunistic
To understand how to detect earnings management, one needs to make comparison between accruals-models to find out for the models that suitable in the context of earnings management. Therefore, merely management of accruals can be addressed and whichever actual management of earnings is omitted of the test (Ball and Shavikumer, 2008).
Ball et al. (2008) indicate that the institutional of the country plays an essential role in reducing the self-interest of earnings management opportunistically and improving the quality of financial reporting. While, there is another opinion suggests that even generalization firms, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, report profits that do not show an improvement in country public law. Another study conducted by Larcker and Richardson (2014), when they studied the connection between earnings and a self-employed auditor, they found that insufficiency of a self-employed audit is related with earnings management
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Effect of earnings management, stock returns and corporate governance
In the determining of stock prices, insofar that the market focuses on declared earnings and ignoring the quality of corporate earnings, there probably an irregular in prices deviating from the real values. In other words, quality of earnings can have prognostic effect for future activities on stock prices (Chan et al. 2006 ). Sloan (1996) believes that stocks with great accruals, which implies that earnings are greater paralleled to cash from operations, experience a less return and less effect than stocks with low accruals, as a result investors focus on reported earnings, they are temporarily misled. For example, as executives puff up earnings above cash from operations, accruals will increase. Excessive accruals may indicate increase or decrease in account receivables or in account liabilities respectively with regards to record of sales.
Another example is a study that conducted by Allen et al. 2011, they use two samples in their analysis, accruals and inventory accruals samples from the COMPASTA data and stock return data from the CRSP monthly returns. They show that estimation errors in extreme accruals are pervasive and that have an economically and statistically effect on earnings management and stock returns.
Recent research conducted by Jiang and Liu (2017), examines the contradictory effects and causes of corporate governance on stock returns reveals its role in determining the discretionary relationship between accruals and expected stock return. When the management of the company is sufficiently effective, the level of earnings management is usually relatively small. Thus the first effect, the reduced uncertainty of manipulation and thus the reduced risk payment. The second effect, more weight on reports about prices, dominates and ensures that the required return increases. To merge, earnings management and stocks returns are likely to move in the same contradictory direction in companies with strong (weak) corporate governance. The endogenicity of both the degree of management of earnings and expected stock returns offer a way to deepen an insight into the effects of information on asset prices, Jiang and Liu (2017). Corporate governance indicates in general to the group of techniques that affect the decisions made by managers when there is a segregation of proprietorship and supervision (David et al. 2005).
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Following up on Sloan (1996) and Chan et al. (2006) to test whether earnings are managed in the operating companies in the Netherland and
Germany to determine the causes and effects of management of earnings on stock returns by applying discretionary accruals models to the artificially manipulated earnings after adding some amount to the reported earnings and also this study shines a light on testing the corporate governance in relation to earnings management and stock returns.
Hypotheses development Some studies have documented that the relationship between earnings management and stock returns is negatively strong, while others suggest a positive strong relationship between earnings management and stock returns (Wali, 2017). Following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995) and Chan et al. 2006 to test the relationship between accruals and stock returns concerning the earnings management. Stock with high accruals, indicate that earnings are high compared to cash flows, next have a lower returns and less effect than stock with low accruals, as a result investors focus on reported earnings will tentatively misled them. For example, as managers puff earnings above cash flows, accruals rise. High accruals may indicate increase or decrease in account receivables or in account liabilities respectively with regards to record of sales. In other words; stock with high accruals have low returns and less effect than stock with low accruals due to earnings management.
Following the core insight of Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), they notice that managers have more opportunities for incorrect reporting through accruals management and real activities, as well as other ways such as balance sheet or operation of cash flows management. The result is therefore often too high due to the opportunistic manipulation of managers. Put on, that the relationship between stock returns and accruals is stronger in highprofit companies compared to less profitable ones. Therefore, our first hypothesis will formulate as follows: H1: Stock with high accruals have low returns and less effect than stock with low accruals due to earnings management Jiang and Liu (2017), examines the contradictory effects and causes of corporate governance on stock returns reveals its role in determining the discretionary relationship between accruals and expected stock returns. While the management of the company is sufficiently effective, the level of earnings management is usually relatively small. Thus the first effect, the reduced uncertainty of manipulation and thus the reduced risk payment. The second effect, more weight on reports about prices, dominates and ensures that the required return increases. Consequently, earnings management and stock returns are likely to move in the same contradictory direction in companies with strong (weak) corporate governance. To follow this explanation, we can formulate our second hypothesis: The estimated portion of total accruals in this study is used to look for earnings management instead of estimated portion of one accrual because total accruals have to absorb a larger part of managers' manipulation (Jones, 1991) . In this study, the methodology based on total accruals will be used, this will rise the opportunity to examine earnings management besides, increases a room to research particular to the Dutch and German setting.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the market reaction with reverence to specific accruals, through the simple and multiple regressing analysis of stock returns on and related elements such as total estimated accruals, cash from operating, net income, non-estimated accruals, and nondiscretionary accruals.
Sample and Data Description
The 
(1/A t-1 ) +  2 (REV t -REC t ) +  3 (PPE t ) eq (2) Whereas: REC t = net receivables in year t minus receivables in year t-1 scaled to total assets in year t 1. The contrast with the original Jones model is that the change in turnover is corrected for the change in receivables in the period in which systematic earnings management takes place. The industry model runs the following regression to estimate non-discretionary accruals: NDAC t =  1 +  2 median i (ACCR t ) eq. (2) Whereas: Median i (ACCR t ) = the median value of total accruals scaled by deferred assets for all non-sampling companies in the same two-digit SIC 1 code.
The company specific factors  1 and  2 are estimated using (OLS) 2 on the explanations in the estimation period from 2009 to 2012 as shown in Table 1 
and 2., the estimated accruals for company i in forecast year p are the forecast error u ip calculated as follows: DA=ACC it /A t-1 -(b 1i 1/ A t-1 + b 2 i (REV t -REC t ) / A t-1 + b 3i PPE t /A teq. (3) whereas: b 1 i, b 2 i, and b 3 i are OLS estimates of α 1i, α 2i, α 3i company-specific factors Multiple regression model with the forecast error from equation 5 as the dependent variable will be used to test the hypotheses:
Empirical Results:
Descriptive statistics
This section is considering at the average, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the total accruals and their components, then income and associated components. Tables 1 and 2 provide brief statistics on the estimation of Equation 1 for each sample company. The modified Jones model has a modest illustrative capacity; the average (median) adjusted R2 is 0.301 (0.289), 0.347 (0.344) for the Dutch and German severally. It seems that the residue is not a serious problem. To test the hypotheses, we analyze the total accruals rather than the current accruals. 
The total accruals (accr) are calculated as: accr = ch current assets -ch current liabilities -cash and d debt equivalent short-term debt and the shortterm part of long-term debt income tax payable -consumption, depletion and amortization. drev t = revenue for the year t less revenue per year t-1 by size total assets at t-1, ppet = total plant equipment and equipment per year were measured by total assets at t-1 A t-1 = total assets in t-1 and a1, a1, a1 = company factors ν t = the term error
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Vol.25 No.116 2019 Table 3 R 2 for 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, are 38.90%, 44.21%, 49.30%, and 46.41%,  and 51.11%, 57.8110%, 60.10%, and 57.31% correspondingly for The Netherlands and Germany. The biggest adjusted R -square is 2010, that is, the year before income increasing. The F statistics for the regression model is only significant at the 0.01 level in 2011.
Total accruals are calculated as: ch current assets -ch short-term debtsch cash & equivalent + short-term part long-term debts + ch income taxes payable-depreciation, depletion & amortization. Discretionary accruals (dac) are fixed. Non-discretionary accruals are calculated as the variation between total accruals (accr) and discretionary accruals (dac). Non-discretionary net income (ndni) is the variation between net income (ni) and discretionary accruals (dac).
indicates a summary of reversion analysis of independent variables and dependent variable. Panels A and B report multi-regressions which are used to test either independents variables for example ni_lta, ppe_, drec, drev, ocf_lta, and acc, are linked or impact the dependent variable stock returns stq-r. The analysis suggests that the association between the two variables is very purposeful with less than 1%. The R-square coefficient indicates a strong negative correlation between these variables. Where this parameter demonstrated that 48.90% and 64.70% of the independent variable for the Netherlands and Germany correspondingly can be described by changes in the dependent variable (stock returns). It can therefore be decided that there is a significant association between earnings management and stock returns. This result is in line with hypothesis H1.
Journal of Economics and
As expected the measurements on company's magnitude are positive and significant in 2009. Moreover, the companies with less capacity have more total accruals' decreasing in the year before book-value decreasing. Then again this measurement is positive in 2009 but not significant. The outcomes are ineffectively fixed with hypothesis H1. The effect on company's magnitude has been measured; the measurements indicate that the intercept for operation leverage, and management ownership, in 2010 and 2011 are not positive, but significant. These results are in line with hypothesis H2; Dutch and German listed companies' accruals tend to be negative at the year before decreasing book-value with the managerial share ownership . This is a strong evidence that companies-level earnings management is reduced by effective governance structure confirms with (Dechow2012, Dechow, Sloan, and To obtain meaningful estimates with the three models are estimated for German listed companies. N refers to 189 company-year regressions associated with the 1890 company-year observations. Mean (median) coefficients are reported with t-statistics (Wilcoxon z-scores) and p-values. Both parametric t test and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied to test whether mean and median coefficients are significantly different from zero. *, **, indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% respectively (two tailed). Adj-R 2 is the average adjusted R-squares of 1443 industry-year pair's regressions. Size ip is equal to 1if company i's sales for 2009 are the highest quartile, and 0 otherwise. Lev ip is equal to the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets for company I for prediction year p . Mgt ip is equal to the percentage of outstanding stocks owned by managers of company I for prediction year p . da is equal to the prediction error for company i for prediction year p. and it computed as in equation 5 This paper examines the performance of discretionary accrual estimation models in a sample of registered operating companies in the Netherlands and Germany. Business plan approach is that executives mainly affect the monetary reporting of the company by using their discretionary accruals. The key driver of this research is to achieve stronger results for earnings management and to provide proof specific to the Netherlands and the German environment through improved models of discretionary accruals (earnings management) with regard to stock returns and corporate governance.
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Vol.25 No.116 2019 Furthermore, the study investigated the association between earnings management, stock returns and corporate governance in order to obtain insights into the triggers or effects of earnings management on stock prices. It suggests that the relationship between earnings management and expected returns occurs and that the discretionary accrual-relationship relies on reported earnings and corporate governance. The link between earnings management, stock returns and corporate governance has been tested. Our results indicate that in these two countries the strong or poor effect of corporate governance varies. The research also shows a moderate effect on earnings management by corporate governance. Moreover, other variables like company magnitude, capital structure or the business sector may also perform a part.
Discretionary accrual models are compared to ensure better suitability and are measured by samples where earnings are expected. This study expects earnings to be better managed in Germany than in the Netherlands. The modified Jones across-sectional model has a modest illustrative capacity. The Jones model postulates that all changes in credit turnover during a certain period are due to profit management. The Jones model postulates that all changes in credit turnover during a certain period are due to profit management. In addition, there are a large number of estimated errors that are associated with the maximum discretionary accruals that have predictable impacts on income, returns on stocks and future cash flows. To test this statement further study is required in this field.
